Zemiological Approach to State Platform Crimes from the Perspective of Structural Harms

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

2 Judge and PhD student, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

10.22108/nrcs.2026.149565.1004

Abstract

Introduction: By moving beyond the crime-centered limitations of criminal law, the social harm approach provides a broader analytical framework for examining harmful behaviors that, although not criminalized under formal legal systems, produce profound and widespread consequences for individuals and society. In the context of platform governance, this perspective is particularly significant because many harms generated or exacerbated through digital platforms stem from governmental decisions, policies, or omissions and can therefore be conceptualized as platform governmental crimes.

Methods: This study employs a descriptive–analytical methodology grounded in the social harm approach to examine the structural harms arising from platform governance. It demonstrates how power embedded within digital infrastructures can generate harmful social consequences without requiring direct violence or explicit decision-making.

Results: The findings identify five principal mechanisms through which platform governance produces deep and enduring social harms: the centralization of data power, platform monopolization, the absence of independent oversight, the transformation of platforms into instruments of governance and their subsequent misuse, and the erosion of transparency and accountability.

Discussion: These harms not only undermine digital rights and civil liberties but also weaken accountability, exacerbate social inequalities, and expand unaccountable power, thereby disrupting the governance structure itself. Accordingly, the social harm approach offers an effective analytical framework for identifying, examining, and addressing platform governmental crimes while underscoring the need to rethink digital governance policies and strengthen independent oversight mechanisms.

Keywords



Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 17 August 2026
  • Receive Date: 02 July 2026
  • Revise Date: 15 August 2026
  • Accept Date: 17 August 2026